When government agencies, research institutes, industries release individual-level data for research and public use, the data is often perturbed in certain ways to provide some level of privacy protection. The recently developed differentially private data synthesis (DIPS) methods are built upon the concept of differential privacy and provides a strong mathematical privacy guarantee while aiming to maintain the statistical utility of the released sanitized data. We introduce a new DIPS algorithm, CIPHER, which generates differential private individual-level data from a set of low-dimensional histograms via solving a set of linear equations with the Tikhonov (l 2 ) regularization. CIPHER is conceptually very simple and requires nothing than decomposing joint probabilities via basic provability rules to construct the equation set and subsequently solving linear equations. We compare CIPHER with the MWEM (multiplicative weighting via exponential mechanism) and the full-dimensional histogram (FDH) sanitization through simulation and case studies. The results demonstrate that CIPHER made significance improvements over MWEM in statistical inferences, both of which aim to generate differentially private synthetic individual-level data from a set of low-dimensional histograms. CIPHER also delivered similar performance as the FDH sanitation for most of the examined privacy budget range.
Introduction 1.Background
When releasing data sets for research or public use, protection of individual private information while still maintaining good utility of the data is of extreme importance. Even with data anonymization, it is still possible for a data intruder to identify a subject in a released data set. For example, the Netflix Prize data set that contained anonymous movie ratings of 500,000 Netflix subscribers was used in conjunction with the public IMDB database to successfully identify individual Netflix users (Narayanan and Shmatikov, 2006, 2008) , uncovering political preferences and other sensitive information of the movie rates in Netflix. Other recent re-identification cases include the Washington state data for health records (Sweeney, 2013) , the New York City Taxi and Limousine Commission data (Tockar, 2014) , and the Australian de-identified open health dataset (Culnane et al., 2017) . These examples, together with other disclosure cases, have intensified the concerns on individual privacy and call for more rigorous and mathematically sound concepts and frameworks to protect individual privacy when releasing data.
Differential privacy (DP) provides a mathematical conceptual framework to bring strong mathematical guarantee for privacy protection, without assuming the intruder's background knowledge (Dwork et al., 2006; Dwork, 2008) . There are DP mechanisms for general query release such as the Laplace mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006) , the exponential mechanism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007; McSherry, 2009) , the median mechanism (Roth and Roughgarden, 2010), the Gaussian mechanism (Dwork et al., 2014) , and the generalized Gaussian mechanism (Liu, 2016a) . There are also DP mechanisms for releasing specific statistical analyses, such as contingency tables (Barak et al., 2007) , data cubes (Ding et al., 2011) , empirical risk optimization (Chaudhuri et al., 2011) , principal component analysis (Chaudhuri et al., 2012) , high-dimensional regression (Kifer et al., 2012) , graphs and social networks (Kasiviswanathan et al., 2013; Yan et al., 2016; Li et al., 2017) , and deep learning (Shokri and Shmatikov, 2015; Abadi et al., 2016) , among others.
Related work
One of the applications of DP is to generate differentially private individual-level synthetic data for release. Bowen and Liu (2016) provide a comprehensive review and comparison on some of the differentially private data synthesis (DIPS) approaches in statistical utility of the synthetic data under the same amount of privacy guarantee. For a high-dimensional data set with p attributes, a full-dimensional (q-way) histogram can be constructed, into which the Laplace noise drawn from Laplace(0, −1 ) is injected, followed by uniform sampling from each sanitized histogram bins to generate individual data. We refer to this approach as the full-dimensional histogram (FDH) Laplace sanitizer. Though technically there is only one query (a single histogram), the number of bins can quickly outgrow n (the sample size) as p increases, resulting in a lot of empty cells in the FDH. From a statistical perspective, constructing an FDH is equivalent to fitting a log-linear models with all possible interactions among all p attributes, whereas in reality, many of the higher-order interactions are white noises and do not represent meaningful signals. If dimensionality reduction techniques are employed on the original data before the differential private sanitization, this could lead to more efficient inferences on statistically meaning signals.
There exist methods that generate differentially private synthetic data from a set of low-dimensional statistics. Barak et al. (2007) use Fourier transforms and linear programming to generate differentially private individual-level synthetic data from the low-order contingency tables. Though consistency, non-negativity, and privacy are ensured, solving the linear programming could be a bottleneck for this algorithm especially when p is large. Hay et al. (2010) introduce a universal histogram approach that benefits the utility of low-order histograms, but at the expense of precision of the higher-order histogram. Li et al. (2014) propose the DPcopula to model the dependency structures among attributes using copula functions and then synthesize DP data from Gaussian copula models. The DPcopula divides the total privacy budget into obtaining differentially private marginal histogram for each attribute and to obtaining differentially private correlation matrix among the attribute. The DPcopula may introduce large noises into the correlation matrix when p is large; in addition, Gaussian copula models are known to have limitations in applications such as allowing only elliptical dependence structures and unable to handle extreme events. Zhang et al. (2014) introduced the PrivBayes for releasing high-dimensional data. PrivBayes differentially privately constructs a Bayesian network with low-dimensional marginals, from which samples are taken to release. The total privacy budget is divided between the network construction and the subsequent differentially private sampling from the network. An important feature of PrivBayes is that it introduces a novel approach that uses a surrogate function for mutual information to build the Bayesian network more accurately. The experiments showed the PrivBayes yielded more accurate low-dimensional histograms compared to several other DP approaches. Chen et al. (2015) use a sampling-based framework to build a dependency graph among attributes, based on which attribute clusters are formed and the synthetic data are ultimately generated from the DP histograms formed by the attribute clusters. The formation of optimal attribute clusters is an NP-hard problem and the authors introduce an approximation algorithm that does not guarantee optimality particularly if there are any non-convexity issues. Liu (2016b) proposes the model-based approach (modips) to generate differentially private synthetic data in the Bayesian framework, by first sanitizing the sufficient statistics in the posterior distribution of the model parameters and then sampling from the posterior predictive distribution to generate differentially private synthetic data. The modips can be computationally intensive in the high-dimensional setting given its Bayesian framework; in addition, it may also lead to a large amount of injected noises if there is a large number of statistics to sanitize, and mis-specification of the Bayesian models would lead to a biased synthetic sample compared to the original data.
All the above methods are one-step procedures for generating synthetic data, another line of research is to use iterative procedures to generate synthetic data, among which the best known is the Multiplicative Weights via Exponential Mechanism (MWEM) approach (Hardt et al., 2012) . MWEM obtains a differentially private empirical distribution given a set of linear queries Q iteratively until convergence, from which synthetic data can be generated. The MWEM algorithm implicitly accounts for the dependency among the queries and adaptively selects a "relevant" query, in the sense that the more different a query is between the original data and the most up-to-date synthetic data, the more likely it will be selected for adjusting the empirical distribution in the next iteration. The data synthesis process is straightforward to implement. The MWEM algorithm achieves the near optimal bound on the l ∞ error (the maximum difference between the queries ∈ Q calculated from the original vs. those calculated from the final synthetic data set, implying the generated differentially private empirical distribution may not be ideal or useful for other types of statistical analysis. Hay et al. (2016) also establish the MWEM does not ensure consistency in the sense that the l ∞ error does not go to 0 as → ∞. Furthermore, choosing the number of iterations T can be challenging. T too small would not be sufficient to allow the empirical distribution to fully capture the original signals summarized in the queries; and T too large would lead to a large amount of noises being injected, eventually leading to a useless synthetic data set as each iteration costs privacy.
Our contributions
We propose a novel DIPS method, namely, Construction of Individual-level data from differentially Private low-dimensional Histograms via solving linear Equations with Tikonov Regularization (CIPHER), to generate an empirical distribution similar to the original while satisfying DP. Similar to the MWEM algorithm, CIPHER generates the individual-level synthetic data from a set of a pre-specified query set Q without referring to a sampling framework. By contrast, both the PriBayes and the DPcopula methods involve sampling from differentially private models (Bayesian networks in the former and the Copula models in the latter), in addition to the initial sanitization of a set low-dimensional histograms. Different from the MWEM algorithm, CIPHER is not iterative; it solves for an empirical distribution for the FDH from a set of differentially private low-dimensional histograms via a series of linear equation sets. Since the linear equations are not of full rank in each step, the Tikonov regularization is applied. During the whole CIPHER process, there is no probing/going back to the original data, thus the DP is preserved in the final FDH, from which The individual-level data are generated from.
CIPHER is conceptually very simple and requires nothing than decomposing joint probabilities via basic provability rules to construct the equation set and subsequently solving linear equations Ax = b. Furthermore, there is minimal computational costs once the equation sets are constructed. Since A is block-diagonal, taking the inverse of A T A is relatively cheap even if the linear equation set is large. Lastly, CIPHER has the ability to automatically "correct" for the inconsistency arising from the differential private sanitization among the histograms that share at least one common attributes, without resorting to constraints when solving equations sets.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the basic concepts in DP and some differentially private mechanisms. Section 3 introduces the CIPHER procedure and propose the SSS (Sign and Statistical Significance) assessment to evaluate the inferences based on differentially private synthetic data against the original inferences. Section 4 compares the CIPHER with the MWEM algorithm and the FDH sanitization the statistical utility of the synthetic data in a simulation study. Section 5 applies the CIPHER to a real-life bankruptcy data set. Section 6 provides some concluding remarks and discusses future research directions.
Preliminaries on Differential Privacy
Consider a data set D. A query or statistic, or a set of queries or statistics f , asks specific questions about the variables or variable relationships in D. The query can be numeric (e.g. mean or count) or qualitative (e.g. most common eye color). Releasing original query results can lead to disclosure of individual-level information. DP provides a rigorous and robust mathematical conceptual framework to to protect individual privacy information when releasing query results.
Definition 1 ( -Differential privacy (Dwork et al., 2006) ). A randomized mechanism R satisfies -differential privacy if for all data sets D 1 and D 2 differing on one element and all result subsets S to query f , e − ≤ Pr[R(f (D 1 ))∈S]
Pr[R(f (D 2 ))∈S] ≤ e . is often referred as the privacy budget and is pre-specified. The smaller is, the more privacy protection is imposed on the individuals in the data, in the sense that the probabilities of getting the same sanitized query results via R for D 1 and D 2 gets more similar. The formulation of privacy via the DP is robust and guards against the worst-case scenario as it does not impose any assumptions about the behavior or the background knowledge of data intruders.
Definition 2 (Sequential Composition and Parallel Composition (McSherry, 2009)). Let q = 1, ..., K represent a set of queries on data D and be the total privacy budget. Denote by M q a randomization mechanism of q -DP. The Sequential Composition states that the sequence of M q (D) provides-DP. The Parallel Composition states that the sequence of of M q (X ∩ D q ) provides -DP if {D q } are arbitrary disjoint subjects of D.
There are a variety of mechanisms to provide differentially private results, as alluded to in Section 1. Here we mention two of them -the Laplace mechanism and the Exponential mechanism, which will be used in the simulation and the case study in Sections 4 and 5, as well as the composition theorems on spending the privacy budget in the case of multiple queries. Mechanism (Dwork et al., 2006) ). The -differentially private Laplace mechanism sanitizes f (D) as in f *
Definition 3 (Laplace
The larger ∆ f is, the more noise would be injected to f (D) to satisfy -DP. A generalization of the Laplace mechanism is the Generalized Gaussian mechanism that is built upon the l p norm (p ≥ 1) and the generalized Gaussian distribution (Liu, 2016a) .
Definition 4 (Exponential Mechanism (McSherry and Talwar, 2007) ). Let u be a utility function that assigns a score to each possible output of a query.
The Exponential mechanism that satisfies -DP releases query result f * (D) with probability exp(u(f * (D); D) 2δu )/ u(f * (D); D) 2δu d(f * (D)), where δ u is the maximum change in score u with one element in data D.
Since the multiplicative weights via the Exponential mechanism (MWEM) algorithm motivates our method CIPHER to be introduced in Section 3, we also briefly introduce the MWEM algorithm. The MWEM is a DP method for generating individual-level synthetic data with the goal to produce relatively accurate but differentially private results to a set of pre-specified linear queries.
The MWEM algorithm is based on the multiplicative weights (MW) method that is often employed in game theory, machine learning, and optimization, among others. For example, a group of n experts are making prediction about an event (Littlestone and Warmuth, 1994) . Denote the initial weight by w (0) i = 1 assigned to each expert i. In each of the next t = 1, ..., T prediction cycles, we will obtain a weighted prediction i w
i , where y i is the prediction from expert i in round t; and will also decrease the weight for each expert who predicts wrongly as in w
Eventually, the experts who keep making wrong predictions will receive weights that are close to 0 and makes no contribution to the weighted predictions across the experts. Hardt et al. (2012) borrow the MW concept and develop the MWEM algorithm in the context of DP to obtain a sanitized empirical distribution approximating a given data set over a set of linear queries. The algorithmic steps are given in Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1 MWEM 1: INPUT: data set D with n cases; query set Q that contain K queries; privacy budget ; number of iterations T . 2: Let A (0) = (A (0) 1 , . . . , A (0) n ) T be an initial distribution (such as the uniform distribution) over n cases. 3: DO t = 1, ..., T
• Exponential Mechanism: Select a query out of query set Q using the exponential mechanism of ( /2T )-DP and score function s k = |q k (A (t−1) ) − q k (D)| for k = 1, . . . , K. Denote the selected query by q (t) . • Laplace Mechanism of ( /2T )-DP: Letq (t) (D) = q (t) (D)+Lap(2T / ). • Multiplicative Weights: Update the weight for each case i = 1, . . . , n as in A
3 Methodology
CIPHER
We develop the CIPHER method to generate differentially-private individual-level synthetic data that approximate the empirical distribution of the original data from a set of low-dimensional histograms. In that sense, CIPHER has a similar goal as the MWEM algorithm. However, the approach CIPHER takes to achieving that goal is very different. Before we list the differences between CIPHER and MWEM, we first present the CIPHER algorithm and its step (Algorithm 2), followed by some remarks about the algorithm. Sanitize all queries ∈ Q via a mechanism of -DP (e.g.,q (l) k = q k +Lap( /(mK)) 5:
for k = 1, . . . , K if the Laplace mechanism is used).
6:
FOR j = p 0 + 1, . . . , p 7:
List all j-way histograms H j .
8:
FOR each query q i ∈ (H j+1 ∩ Q), run the steps below.
1) Denote the set of variables that form query q i by X i and p i = |X i |.
2) Randomly pick a variable out of X i . WLOG, denote that variable by X i0 , and the rest of the variables by X i1 , . . . , X i,p i . 3) For k = 1, . . . ,
where z k is the conditional probability of (X i0 = K i0 ) given the rest of variables in X i , A k is either observed or calculated from step j − 1, and (X i0 = K i0 ) represents a vector of K i0 − 1 events (X i0 = 1, . . . ,
where I is the identity matrix. 5) Calculate the empirical probability for q i : Pr(X i ) = z · Pr(X i \ X i0 ).
9:
END FOR 10:
END FOR

11:
Correct for negativity and normalize the empirical joint probability (Pr(X)) (l) = (Pr(X 1 , ..., X p )) (l) (see Remark 4).
13:
Generate differentially private dataD (l) of size n from (Pr(X)) (l) . 14: END FOR 15: OUTPUT: m sets of differentially private dataD (1) , . . . ,D (m) .
In brief, the CIPHER mechanism starts from the lowest-order histograms in the given set of histograms Q and arrives at a solution of the differentially private empirical distribution using a stepwise approach, without a need for complex sampling algorithms. The histograms in Q, which do not have to be of the same dimension, are expected to capture the important signals and relationships among the attributes in the original data. This implicitly assumes that histograms of dimension higher than those in Q do not exhibit any meaningful relationship on top of what's provided in Q. Regarding the dimensionality of the histograms in Q, the two extremes would be the p-dimensional FDH among all p variables on one end and the p marginal histograms (one per variable) on the other end; the former represents the p-way interactions among the variables whereas the later would imply independence among all variables.
Remark 1 (DP of CIPHER). The satisfaction of the DP in CIPHER is straightforward to establish. The only times the original data is probed during CIPHER is when the queries in Q are sanitized, and it is accessed mK times with a privacy budget of /(mK) per access. Per the sequential composition, the total privacy budget is maintained at (mK) /(mK) = .
Remark 2 (number of synthetic data m). We recommend setting m at a small number > 1 if the released data will be used for statistical inferences, as releasing multiple sets offers a convenient way to account for the uncertainty and randomness introduced by the sanitization and synthesis procedures, coupled with proper inferential combination rules (Liu, 2016b) . It is easy to implement in practice and can be viewed as a Monte Carlo way to account for the uncertainty. Though releasing a single set coupled with explicitly modeling the sanitization mechanism and the synthesis model can also help to accommodate the uncertainty, the modeling can be both analytically and computationally much more challenging compared to releasing multiple sets. In addition, as long as m is not too large in that the total privacy budget is not spread too thin over the multiple sets (each synthetic set receive a privacy budget of /m per the sequential composition theorem), the precision gained by averaging over m sets of synthetic data could outweigh the additional noises introduced from releasing multiple sets than a single set.
Remark 3 (Tikhonov regularization). The reason for using the Tikhonov regularization (aka the l 2 regularization) to solve for z from Az = b is that the columns of A are linearly dependent and A T A is not full rank. The Tikhonov regularization is known for solving ill-posed problems like Az = b when the solution z is not unique due to the singularity of A. (Tikhonov, 1963; Tikhonov et al., 2013) . It works by adding a small positive constant λ to the diagonal elements of A T A, and calculating z = (A T A + λI) −1 A T b. The constant λ is a tuning parameter. We found from the empirical studies that the solutions from CIPHER are relatively robust to the choice of λ and leads to roughly the same solutions on the joint distribution except for some negligible numerical error for a wide range of n , if λ is relatively small (on the order of o(1)).
Remark 4 (correction of non-negativity and normalization). When the queries in Q are sanitized at the beginning of the CIPHER algorithm, the sanitized probability queries in a histogram can be < 0 or ≥ 1, they might not sum to 1. In addition, the solutions for the conditional probabilities from the linear questions can also be < 0 or ≥ 1. We could correct for the non-negativity by boundary inflation truncation (Liu, 2016c) and normalize the probabilities in each step when they do not satisfy these two conditions, or we could wait until the last step of generating and sampling from the differentially private empirical distribution to make one overall correction. We compared both approaches and found that most of the times the two led to similar results and one final overall correction in some cases led to better results. Given this, and the fact that one correction is easier operationally and computational than taking multiple corrections, we suggest users take one final correction in the joint distribution of X.
Remark 5 (consistency in histogram marginals). If two or more histograms in Q share the same variable(s), then after the differential private sanitization, the frequencies in the histograms formed by the shared variables would be inconsistent. For example, suppose one histogram H 1 ∈ Q is constructed from V 1 , V 2 and V 3 and the other H 2 ∈ Q is constructed from V 1 , V 2 and V 4 . The original count in any given bin of the histogram H(V 1 , V 2 ) formed by V 1 and V 2 calculated from the two 3-dimensional histograms H 1 and H 2 would be the same, so would be that in the marginal histograms H(V 1 ) and H(V 2 ), respectively. However, after noises being injected in the differential private sanitization of H 1 and H 2 , the bin counts in the H(V 1 , V 2 ) formed from H 1 and H 2 are not the same. Barak et al. (2007) transform the data into the Fourier domain, where adding noise will not violate consistency. However, this approach has a bottleneck in the linear programming when p is large. Neither the MWEM algorithm nor our proposed CIPHER procedure have this issue with the way they solve for the empirical distributions. Intuitively, the inconsistency among the tables picked and sanitized during the iterations of the MWEM or among the histograms in Q if they have shared variables in CIPHER is automatically averaged out during the WM updating in the former or when solving for the non-full rank linear equation set with the Tikhonov regularization in the the later.
Example: the 3-variable case
We now illustrate the CIPHER procedure with a simple example. The simulation study and the case study in Sections 4 and 5 contain more complicated applications of CIPHER. The supplementary materials also list several examples when p = 3 and p = 4.
Denote the 3 variables by
} be all the 2-way histograms; therefore p 0 = 2 in Algorithm 2. WLOG, suppose V 3 is X 0 in Algorithm 2. We first find the relationships among the probabilities
CIPHER vs MWEM
Comparing Algorithms 1 and 2, it is easy to see that the CIPHER procedure is different from the MWEM algorithm, though their goals are similar. CIPHER is not an iterative procedure and relies on solving one or more sets of linear equations analytically to reach the differentially private empirical joint distribution among the p variables. The queries in CIPHER are sanitized through a DP mechanism (say the Laplace sanitizer) before being fed into the algorithm and they only need to be sanitized once. By contrast, the MWEM algorithm is iterative, and each iteration incurs privacy cost due to it accessing the original data to fetch the query selected by the Exponential mechanism, which is subsequently sanitize the Laplace mechanism.
The privacy costs of the CIPHER and MWEM procedures can be compared as follows. Suppose the total privacy cost is fixed at for both the CIPHER and MWEM algorithms. Denote the number of queries in Q by |Q|. If we use equal allocation of the privacy budget, then each query in Q gets a budget of /|Q| in the CIPHER algorithm. Suppose the number of iterations in the MWEM is T , then the sanitization of each query selected by the Exponential mechanism in the Laplace mechanism is /(2T ). On the other hand, a query can be selected multiple times in the MWEM algorithm throughout the T iteration. Let c k denote that times that how many times q k is selected. Only if c k > 2T |Q| −1 , then the budget allocated to query k in the MWEM algorithm would be larger than that in CIPHER.
The SSS assessment
To evaluate the information preservation in the statistical inferences fir model parameters based on the differentially private synthetic data when hypothesis testing is involved, we propose the SSS assessment. The first S refers to the the Sign of the estimated parameter, and the second and third S' refer to the Statistical Significance of the estimated parameter. The consistency in the sign and statistical significance for the parameter estimates based on the original and synthetic data are compared, leading to seven possible scenarios as listed in Table 1 . The best scenario is when both the sign and the statistical significance Table 1 : Preservation of Signs and Statistical Significance on the estimated parameters (the SSS assessment) of the parameter estimates from the original and synthetic data match; and the worst case scenario is that both estimates are statistically significant but with opposite signs, which entails detrimental consequences in practice. Between the two extremes, there are five other possibilities.
• II+ and I+ indicate an increase in Type II and Type I error rates, respectively. In both cases, the signs match, but the statistical significance goes from significance to non-significance in the synthetic data in II+, resulting in an inflated Type II error rate; and goes from non-significance in the original to significance in the synthetic data, resulting in an inflated Type I error rate.
• Neutral indicates that the signs change between the original data and the synthetic data, but are not significant in both cases.
• II-indicates a sign change and the statistical significance changes from being significant in the original to non-significant in the synthetic; and I-indicates a sign change and the statistical significance changes from being non-significant in the original to significant in the synthetic data.
For the synthetic data, We would want the probability of the best scenario to be high, followed by Neural, II+, II-, I+, I-; and hope the worst case scenario has the close-to-0 probability to occur. We apply the SSS assessment in both the simulation study and the real-life case study to compare the inferences between the original data and the synthetic data via DIPS methods.
Simulation Study
In this section, we run a simulation study to investigate the inferential properties and the utility of the sanitized data sets generated via CIPHER, benchmarked against the MWEM algorithm and the FDH sanitization of the Laplace mechanism. The simulation study examined a data scenario with 4 categorical variables, where V 1 and V 2 had 2 categories each and V 3 and V 4 had 3 categories each, leading to 36 cells in the full 4-way cross-tabulation. The data was simulated sequentially via multinomial/logistic regression. Specifically, V 1 ∼ Bernoulli(0.5), logit(Pr(V 2 = 1|V 1 )) = β 0 + β 1 V 1 with β 0 = 0.5 and β 1 = 1; V 3 was simulated from multinomial model ln (
with β 01 = 1.5, β 11 = −1, β 21 = 0.5, β 31 = 1, β 41 = −2, β 02 = 1, β 12 = −1.5, β 22 = −0.5, β 32 = 0.75, and β 42 = −1. We examined two samples sizes scenarios n = 200 and n = 500, each under five privacy budget scenarios = {e −2 , e −1 , e 0 , e 1 , e 2 }. n = 200 would be regarded as a potential data sparsity scenario for the FDH as the cell size is just about 5 on average. We run 1,000 repetitions for each possible n and scenario.
Each DIPS method generated m = 5 synthetic data sets so to propagate the uncertainty of the synthesis model and the randomness brought by the differential private mechanism.
Each synthetic data set had the same sample size as the original data set.
• In the CIPHER algorithm, we considered two different query sets Q: (1) Q contains all 3-way cross-tabulation among V 1 , V 2 , V 3 and V 4 ; and (2) Q contains all two-way cross-tabulation among the four variables. In each case, we sanitized all the histograms in Q and followed steps in Algorithm 2 to synthesize the individual-level data. Moving forward, we will refer to them as CIPHER Three-Way and CIPHER Two-Way respectively. The linear equation sets in both cases are presented in the Supplementary materials. Note that the set in CIPHER 3-way is a necessary intermediate step in CIPHER 2-way. In other words, from all the 2-way histograms, we solve for all possible 3-way, from which, the joint distribution of the 4 variables is then solved.
• In the FDH sanitization, Laplace noises drawn from Lap(0, (m ) −1 ) were added to all 36 cell counts in the full cross-tabulation of all 4 variables.
• For the MWEM algorithm, the starting distribution was mutually independent categorical distribution with equal probability across all categories for each of the four variables. We also examined two scenarios of the queries, as in CIPHER, to be fed to the algorithm: all two-way tables (6 in total) and all three-way tables (4 in total). The number of iterations in the MWEM was set at T = 5 in all cases. We also run for larger T (such as T = 10), but the results did not seem to improve over T = 5, so we do not present them here. As T increased, the total budget seemed to spread too thin across each iteration, resulting in quite a lot noises being injected into the queries, and some variables actually started to "lose" some levels in the synthetic data (e.g. the synthesized values of V 1 were the same across each individual), clearly making the synthetic data sets unusable. We also compared the results between MWEM 3-way and MWEM 2-way, there are basically no differences between the two, and we thus only present the results from MWEM 2-way.
The synthetic data could be highly unbalanced in the marginal distribution of each variable due to the injected noises. For example, if the frequency of a level in the marginal distribution of a variable becomes very small, say < 5, subsequent modeling, such as logistic regression, can be problematic (e.g., non-convergence, unstable estimates, among others). To avoid this potential issue, we "pre-screened" for ill-conditioned synthetic data sets. If any of the four variables had a marginal count less than 5 in a synthetic data set, we re-run and generated a new synthetic set. In this simulation, the chance of generating an ill-conditioned data set was close to 0 for MWEW and the FDH sanitization, and for CIPHER when ≥ 1, was around 10% for CIPHER across all the examined values and n, except when = e −2 and n = 200 (see the Supplementary Materials).
We run two types of analyses in synthetic data, In the first analysis, the average total variation distance (TVD) between the original and synthetic data sets was calculated for the cell probabilities in all three-way, two-way and one-way tables, respectively. Specifically, the TVD for the cell probabilities in a table was defined as |p −p * |/2, where p andp * were the cell probabilities in the original data and those averaged over the m synthetic data sets, which was then averaged for all k-way tables, where k = 1, 2, 3, respectively. In the second analysis, we fitted the multinomial regression model with V 4 as the outcome, and V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 as covariates. The inferences from the 5 synthetic data sets were combined using the combination rule in Liu (2016b). Specifically, the final point estimate for a parameter β isβ = m −1 m j=1β (j) , whereβ (j) is the MLE of β in synthetic set j; and the variance is estimated by
The bias, root mean square errors (RMSE), coverage probabilities (CP) and confidence interval (CI) width of the 95% CI, and the SSS assessment were determined for each of the regression coefficients from the multinomial regression model.
The results for the average TVD are presented in Figure 1 . The FDH sanitization was the best performer overall especially in the 3-way table case for ≥ e −1 , followed by CIPHER. The MWEM delivered the smallest TVDs for the 1-way, 2-way and the 3-way tables at n = 200 for = e −2 , but was outperformed by either FDH sanitization and CIPHER for other scenarios of n and . CIPHER 2-way and 3-way were similar and both were similar to the FDH sanitization in the 2-way and 1-way case for ≥ 1.
The results for bias, RMSE, CP, and CI width are presented in Figure 3 for n = 200 and in Figure 4 for n = 500. The results are summarized as follows. First, between MWEM 2-way and CIPHER (3-Way and 2-Way), both of which generate individual-level data given a set of low-dimensional histograms, CIPHER was the obvious winner with smaller bias and near-nominal CP across all examined and both n scenarios. Though the MWEM had the smallest RMSE and CI width among all three DIPS for ≤ 1, it suffered severe under-coverage (the CP was 0% for some parameters). Second, at n = 500, CIPHER 2-Way was more efficient with smaller RMSE for most parameters than the FDH Laplace sanitizer for small (≈ 0.14). The FDH Laplace sanitizer and the CIPHER had similar biases and near-nominal CP for most parameters. The performance of the FDH Laplace sanitizer improved quickly with the increased ; similar to CIPHER in every metric at = e −2 ≈ 0.135, and better than CIPHER when > e −1 ≈ 0.368. Third, the performance of the MWEM algorithm seemed to be quite consistent regardless of , implying the optimality of the MWEW algorithm as measured by the L ∞ error of the designed query set does not necessarily hold in other types of analysis.
The results for the SSS assessment on the regression coefficients from the logistic regression are provided in Figures 2. Note that a DIPS method with the longest red bar (best-case scenario) and the shortest purple bar (the worst-case scenario) would be preferable. The two inflated type I error types (I+/yellow bar and I-/blue bar) would be preferably of low probability. The two inflated type II error or decreased power types (II+/orange bar and I-/green bar) and neural (gray) are acceptable. Per the listed criteria above, first, it is comforting to see the undesirable cases (purple+blue bars) are the shortest among all the 7 scenarios for each DIPS method; second, as expected, the inferences got better as increased except for MWEM, implying that the gap between MWEM and the other algorithms increases with increased ; third, the FDH Laplace sanitation was the best performer in preserving SSS, especially for the middle-ranged , followed closely by CIPHER 3-way and 2-way. Overall, the non-ignorable proportions of II+ (and II-when was small), even when was as large as e 2 was hard, suggests the injected noises decrease the efficiency of the statistical inferences, which is expected and the price paid for privacy protection. 
Case Study
We apply the CIPHER procedure to generate synthetic data for a real-life qualitative bankruptcy data set. As a comparison, we also generated the synthetic data via the FDH Laplace sanitization and the MWEM algorithm. We compared the statistical utility of the synthetic data by running two statistical analyses, and comparing them to the original results.
The bankruptcy data
Qualitative bankruptcy data are often used for feature selection in bankruptcy prediction and to discover experts' decision rules on bankruptcy vs. non-bankruptcy given the qualitative attributes (Kim and Han, 2003; Tsai, 2009; Nagaraj and Sridhar, 2015) . The qualitative bankruptcy data set used in this section was originally collected to identify the qualitative risk factors associated with bankruptcy and is available for download from the UCI Machine Learning repository (Dheeru and Karra Taniskidou, 2017) . The data contains n = 250 businesses and 7 variables ( Table 2) . Though the data set does not contain any identifiers, sensitive information (such as the bankruptcy evaluation or Credibility) many still be disclosed using the pseudo-identifiers left in the data (such as Industrial Risk or Competitiveness). In addition, the data can also used to be linked to other public data to trigger other types of information disclosure. In summary, this public data might not as safe as it appears. Bankruptcy (107), Non-Bankruptcy (143)
The DIPS methods
When applying CIPHER to the bankruptcy data, we first decided on the set of lower-dimensional histograms to be sanitized. If we applied a model selection procedure to select the set of queries Q, we would have to allocate a portion of the the total budget to the model selection procedure, leaving less for the synthesis step. Given that p is relatively small (there are 7 attributes in the qualitative bankruptcy data), we opted forgoing the model selection procedure and selected Q based on computational and analytical when solving linear equations, but ensuring the p variables interacted in the format of 2D histograms.
If Q contains all 2D histograms or all the 3D histograms, we would need five and four intermediate steps, respectively, to reach the solutions on the bin counts in the 7-way FDH, working all the way up from solving the 3-(if Q contains all 2D histograms), 4-, 5-, and 6-way bin counts along the way. Both approaches can be analytically tedious though not difficult. Taken into account the analytical and computational considerations, we elected to first create a 6-category Class/Credibility variable from the full cross-tabulation, both of which can be regarded as sensitive information and might be associated, and a 9-category Industrial Risk/Competitiveness cross-tabulation; and then applied the CIPHER 2-way to the 5 variables with 6 (Class/Credibility), 9 (Risk/Competitiveness), 3 (Industrial Risk), 3 (Management Risk), and 3 (Financial Flexibility) levels respectively. After the synthetic data were generated, we decoupled the two sets of combined variables (Class/Credibility and Risk/Competitiveness), so the final synthetic data set still contain all 7 attributes as in the original data set. In terms of the original 7 attributes, Q employed by the CIPHER procedure contains one 4D histogram, six 3D histograms, and three 2D histograms. cell size 0 1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 11 all # cells 1355 29 50 2 15 2 1 1 1 1 1 1438 In the implementation of the FDH Laplace sanitizer, there are 1,458 bins in the full 7D histogram (see table above). All the 135 empty cells can be regarded sample zeros, meaning that these bins are empty because of the finite sample size, and we would expect the empty cells would disappear as the sample size increases or in a different sample data set. These sample-zero cells are part of the data and should be sanitized as the non-empty cells; otherwise, information about the raw data would be leaked.
In the MWEM algorithm, the query set was the same as the Q used in CIPHER. We examined two iteration scenarios with T = 5 and T = 20, depending on the value of . Since the total privacy budget needs to be allocated to each iteration, we run T = 5 iterations for small epsilon (≈ 0.14, 0.37) and T = 20 iterations for larger epsilon (1 or ≈ 2.27), so that the amount of noise that is added was not so small to cause the algorithm to fixate on only a few of the points in the data set.
We consider four privacy budget levels = e −2 , e −1 , e 0 , e 1 , and run 24 repetitions in each of the 3 DIPS methods. In each repetition, 5 synthetic data sets with n = 250 were generated. Companies and banks would have keen interest in what predicts bankruptcy/non-bankruptcy (the two levels of Class) and predicting well on the bankruptcy status, given that they have a lot investments and must chose clients carefully. Therefore, we ran a logistic regression model with "Class" as the outcome variable and the other attributes as predictors, as well as a support vector machine (SVM) analysis to predict "Class" using other attributes, benchmarked against the original results. In both the logistic regression and the SVM analyses, the results from the 5 synthetic data sets were combined using the combination properties outlined in Liu (2016b).
Results
In the logistic regression model, we examined the relationships of the 6 qualitative categorical covariates (IR, MR, FF, CR, CO, and OR) with the outcome variable of Class to determine the odds of bankruptcy (Kim and Han, 2003) . Each of the categorical covariates had three categories, and the "average" level of risk was used as the reference for each. Specifically, the model was log P (bankruptcy) 1−P (bankruptcy) = β 0 + β 1 · IR N + β 2 · IR P + β 3 · MR N + β 4 · MR P + β 5 · FF N + β 6 · FF P + β 7 · CR N + β 8 · CR P + β 9 · CO N + β 10 · CO P + β 11 · OR N + β 12 · OR P . The regression coefficients of β and their variance estimates were estimated using the R package logistf, which implements the Firth's bias-reduced penalized-likelihood logistic regression (Heinze and Ploner, 2016). We applied the SSS assessment to the estimated parameters (details on each scenario of preservation are given in Section 3.4), and the results are presented in Figure 5 . The figure suggests that all three DIPS methods performed well in the sense that the probability that they produced a "bad" estimate (the worst, II-, and I-categories) was close to 0, and the estimates were mostly likely to land in the "best" or the "neutral" categories. The FDH Laplace sanitizer had the largest chance to produce estimates in the "best" category for ≥ e −1 . MWEM, regardless of , had around 50% probability to land in the "best" category or in "neutral". Overall, the three algorithms seemed performance similarly per the SSS assessment.
Figure 5: The SSS assessment on the logistic regression coefficients in the bankruptcy data
We employed the SVM to classify Class and determine the bankruptcy/non-bankruptcy status, given the six qualitative risk attributes. For the SVM analysis, we randomly split the original data into a training data set of 200 samples (80% of n = 250) and a testing data set of 50 (20% of n = 250). The prediction accuracy with the original training data was 100%. The same testing set was used in all 24 repetitions to evaluate the predictive power of the SVMs constructed from the synthetic training data from CIPHER, MWEM, and the FDH Laplace sanitization; and the results are presented in Table 3 . CIPHER was the obvious winner with significantly better prediction accuracy at ≤ e −1 ; and and outperformed the Laplace sanitize by ∼ 5% at = e 0 = 1. When = e 1 , the FDH Laplace sanitizer delivered the best with about 86% prediction accuracy, followed by CIPHER with about 78% accuracy. Regardless of , MWEM had difficulty in classifying Class, with an accuracy rate between 45-55% at all the examined . The prediction accuracy with the original training data was 100%.
Discussion
We proposed the CIPHER algorithm to release differentially private synthetic data sets given a set of low dimensional histograms. We also proposed the SSS assessment as a way to evaluate the utility of the synthetic data in statistical inferences. We compared our algorithm with the FDH Laplace sanitization and the MWEM algorithm in a simulation study and in a real-life qualitative bankruptcy data set.
CIPHER and MWEM share similar goal to generate differentially private empirical distribution given a set of low-dimensional queries. In the simulation study and the case study, CIPHER significantly improved over MWEM across various sample sizes and privacy budget scenarios in terms statistical inferences. In addition, the performance of MWEM did not seem to improve with the increase in the overall privacy budget or the sample size, suggesting the optimality established in the MWEW algorithm as measured by the L ∞ error for the designed query set does not necessarily translate into other types of analysis. The CIPHER delivered similar performance to the FDH Laplace sanitization when was either relatively small or large, but FDH Laplace sanitization was better than the CIPHER around the middle ranged values (in the neighborhood of 1) in the examined scenarios.
We did not consider the model selection perspective in this discussion. If a formal model selection procedure based on the original data is employed first to select the query set Q, then the total privacy budget will need to be split into two portions: w 1 for the model selection and w 2 for data synthesis through the CIPHER, where w 1 + w 2 = 1. The conclusions and findings from our simulation and case studies still hold, understanding the employed privacy budget in these studies is only part of the total budget /w 2 . If the the query set Q is determined without referring to the original data, but rather based on domain expertise (biology, finance, medicine, etc), common sense, public knowledge, or other consideration (such as technical difficulty, computational cost), then the total budget can all be spent for data synthesis through CIPHER. If one would rather spend some budget on picking a good Q, it might be worth it in the long run as the synthetic data will likely to be more loyal to the original data with a carefully picked model. The CIPHER takes a set of low-dimensional differentially private histograms as input.
In the case of all categorical attributes, the histograms are just cross-tabulations among the attributes, which is the case examined in the simulation and case studies. In the case of numerical attributes, we can generate histograms ysing techniques as described in Scott (2015) (this is another reason for keep the dimensions of the histograms in the query set low if at all possible as high-dimensional histograms with good statistical properties are difficult to construct). After the discretization, the variables are basically categorical with the number of levels being the number of the bins in the histogram, onto which CIPHER is applied to generate the empirical joint distribution among the variables. For any numerical attributes involved in the final histogram, we could uniformly sample from the bins to "transform" the discretized values back to the numerical values for these attributes.
As for future work, we plan to work out the theory for CIPHER on its accuracy and data utility by some criterion (such as l 1 or l ∞ norm on the FDH and on the queries in Q). In addition, we plan to apply CIPHER to data sets of higher dimensions than the bankruptcy data in terms of both attributes and the number of levels per attribute to see how CIPHER scales up in those cases. Ding, B., Winslett, M., Han, J., and Li, Z. (2011) Dwork, C., McSherry, F., Nissim, K., and Smith, A. (2006) . Calibrating noise to sensitivity in private data analysis. In Theory of Cryptography Conference, pages 265-284. Springer.
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1 More Simulation Results 1.1 n = 200 In this section, we illustrate the derivation of the linear equation set given a pre-specified query set Q in the following three scenarios: (1) 3-variable 2 × 2 × 2 case with Q = all 2-way histograms; 2) 3-variable 2 × 3 × 3 case with Q = all 2-way histograms; 3) 4 variable case: 2 × 2 × 3 × 3 with Q = all 2-way histograms.
2.1 Three variable case (2 × 2 × 2)
In the 3 variable case 2 × 2 × 2, we first obtain
Examining each scenario of V 1 and V 2 , the two equations above can be expanded into four equations.
P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 0) = P (V 3 = 0|V 2 = 0, V 1 = 0)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 0) + P (V 3 = 0|V 2 = 1, V 1 = 0)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 0) P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 1) = P (V 3 = 0|V 2 = 0, V 1 = 1)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 1) + P (V 3 = 0|V 2 = 1, V 1 = 1)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 1) P (V 3 = 0|V 2 = 0) = P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 0) + P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 0) P (V 3 = 0|V 2 = 1) = P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 1) + P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 1)
(1)
Using the sanitized values from the 2-way tables, then the left hand sides of the four equations above b = (P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 0), P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 1), P (V 3 = 0|V 2 = 0), P (V 3 = 0|V 2 = 1)) are known. Additionally, on the right hand side, the elements of P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 0), P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 1), P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 0), P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 1), P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 0), P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 1), P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 0), and P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 1) can be calculated from the sanitized 2-way tables. Therefore, Eqn (1) can be written as b = Az, where ‡ = (P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0), P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0), P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1), P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1)) A contains known coefficients associated with z. Note that though there are four equations in Eqn (1), they actually are linearly dependent, Therefore, we apply the Tikhonov regularization to solve for the four unknowns in z. Once we get z P (V 3 = 1|V 1 , V 2 ) = 1 − P (V 3 = 0|V 1 , V 2 ), we can subsequently calculate the joint probability among (V 1 , V 2 , V 3 ) as in
, from which we can sample the synthetic data.
2.2 Three variable case for (2 × 3 × 3)
In the 3 variable case (2 × 3 × 3), the initial equations are
Examining each scenario of V 1 and V 2 , we can expand the above 4 equations into 10 equations with 12 unknowns. The left sides of the 10 equations compose b, and z comprises of the 12 unknowns, which are the conditional probabilities of V 3 = 0|V 1 , V 2 and V 3 = 1|V 1 , V 2 , and A contains the corresponding coefficients. We apply the Tikhonov regularization to solve for z from b = Az.
(9) P (V 3 = 1|V 2 = 1) = P (V 3 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 1) + P (V 3 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 1) (10) P (V 3 = 1|V 2 = 2) = P (V 3 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 2)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 2) + P (V 3 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 2)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 2) (11) 2.3 Four variable case (2 × 2 × 3 × 3)
In this example, the variables V 1 and V 2 have two categories, and V 3 and V 4 have three categories. We assume the query set Q consists of all 2D histograms among he variables of V 1 , V 2 , V 3 and V 4 (The procedures are similar if Q consists of other types of histograms, such as all 3D histograms, and a mixture of 2D or 3D histograms). CIPHER first solves for the probability distribution for all 3D histograms given 2D histograms, the procedures are similar to the 3-variable examples in Sections 2.1 and 2.2 of the supplementary materials. Once the 3D histograms are available, we can calculate the probability distribution of the four variable is calculated given the 3D histograms.
The initial equations are
= P (V 4 = 0|V 2 = 0, V 1 , V 3 )P (V 2 = 0|V 1 , V 3 ) + P (V 4 = 0|V 2 = 1, V 1 , V 3 )P (V 2 = 1|V 1 , V 3 ) P (V 4 = 0|V 2 , V 3 ) = P (V 4 = 0, V 1 = 0|V 2 , V 3 ) + P (V 4 = 0, V 1 = 1|V 2 , V 3 ) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 , V 3 )P (V 1 = 0|V 2 , V 3 ) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 , V 3 )P (V 1 = 1|V 2 , V 3 ) P (V 4 = 1|V 1 , V 2 ) = P (V 4 = 1, V 3 = 0|V 1 , V 2 ) + P (V 4 = 1, V 3 = 1|V 1 , V 2 ) + P (V 4 = 1, V 3 = 2|V 1 , V 2 ) = P (V 4 = 1|V 3 = 0, V 1 , V 2 )P (V 3 = 0|V 1 , V 2 ) + P (V 4 = 1|V 3 = 1, V 1 , V 2 )P (V 3 = 1|V 1 , V 2 ) + P (V 4 = 1|V 3 = 2, V 1 , V 2 )P (V 3 = 2|V 1 , V 2 ) P (V 4 = 1|V 1 , V 3 ) = P (V 4 = 1, V 2 = 0|V 1 , V 3 ) + P (V 4 = 1,
Examining each scenario of V 1 , V 2 , and V 3 , we can expand the above 6 equations into 32 with 24 unknowns (the conditional probability. Again, 32 equations are linearly dependent, and its rank is < 24. Therefore, we apply the Tikhonov regularization to solve for z from b = Az, where b contains the left sides of the 32 equations, and z refer to the conditional probabilities of V 4 = 0|V 1 , V 2 , V 3 and V 4 = 1|V 1 , V 2 , V 3 , and A contains the corresponding coefficients.
P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0)P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1)P (V 3 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0) (12) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2)P (V 3 = 2|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0) P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0)P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1)P (V 3 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0) (13) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2)P (V 3 = 2|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0) P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0)P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1)P (V 3 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1) (14) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2)P (V 3 = 2|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1) P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0)P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1)P (V 3 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1) (15) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2)P (V 3 = 2|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1) P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 0) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 0) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 0) (16) P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 0) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 0) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 0) (17) P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 1) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 1) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 1) (18) P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 1) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 1) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 1) (19) P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 2) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 2) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 2) (20) P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 2) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 2) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 2) (21) P (V 4 = 0|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0) (22) P (V 4 = 0|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0) (23) P (V 4 = 0|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1) (24) P (V 4 = 0|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1) (25) P (V 4 = 0|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2) (26) P (V 4 = 0|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2) = P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2) + P (V 4 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2) (27) P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0)P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1)P (V 3 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0) (28) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2)P (V 3 = 2|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0) P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0)P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1)P (V 3 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0) (29) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2)P (V 3 = 2|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0) P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0)P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1)P (V 3 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1) (30) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2)P (V 3 = 2|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1) P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0)P (V 3 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1)P (V 3 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1) (31) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2)P (V 3 = 2|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1) P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 0) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 0) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 0) (32) P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 0) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 0) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 0) (33) P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 1) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 1) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 1) (34) P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 1) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 1) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 1) (35) P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 2) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 2) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 3 = 2) (36) P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 2) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2)P (V 2 = 0|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 2) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2)P (V 2 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 3 = 2) (37) P (V 4 = 1|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 0) (38) P (V 4 = 1|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 0) (39) P (V 4 = 1|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 1) (40) P (V 4 = 1|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 1) (41) P (V 4 = 1|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 0, V 3 = 2) (42) P (V 4 = 1|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2) = P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 0, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2)P (V 1 = 0|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2) + P (V 4 = 1|V 1 = 1, V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2)P (V 1 = 1|V 2 = 1, V 3 = 2) (43)
